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Abstract
This article proposes a theory of watermarking security based on a cryptanalysis point of view. The
main idea is that information about the secret key leaks fromthe observations, for instance watermarked
pieces of content, available to the opponent. Tools from information theory (Shannon’s mutual information
and Fisher’s information matrix) can measure this leakage of inf rmation. The security level is then
defined as the number of observations the attacker needs to successfully estimate the secret key. This
theory is applied to two common watermarking methods: the substit tive scheme and the spread spectrum
based techniques. Their security levels are calculated against three kinds of attack. The experimental work
illustrates how Blind Source Separation (especially Independent Component Analysis) algorithms help
the opponent exploiting this information leakage to discloe the secret carriers in the spread spectrum
case. Simulations assess the security levels derived in thetheoretical part of the article.
Index Terms
Watermarking, Security, Equivocation, Fisher information matrix, Blind source separation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital watermarking studies have always been driven by theimprovement ofrobustness. Most of arti-
cles of this field deal with this criterion, presenting more and more impressive experimental assessments.
Some key events in this quest are the use of spread spectrum [1], the invention of resynchronization
schemes [2], [3], the discovery of side information channel[4], [5], and the formulation of the opponent
actions as a game [6].
On the contrary,securityreceived little attention in the watermarking community. The first difficulty
is that security and robustness are neighboring concepts, which are hardly perceived as different. The
intentionality behind the attack is not enough to make a clear cut between these two concepts. An image
compression is clearly an attack related to robustness, butit might happen intentionally,i.e. with the
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purpose of removing the watermark, or not.Robustwatermarking is defined in [7] as a communication
channel multiplexed into original content in a non-perceptible way, and whose “capacity degrades as
a smooth function of the degradation of the marked content”. We add that the degradation is due to a
classical content processing (compression, low-pass filtering, noise addition, geometric attack . . . ). The
attacker has three known strategies to defeat watermark robustness: to remove enough watermark signal
energy, to jam the hidden communication channel, or to desynchro ize the watermarked content.
T. Kalker then defines watermarkingsecurityas “the inability by unauthorized users to access[i.e.
to remove, to read, or to write the hidden message]th communication channel” established by a
robust watermarking. Security deals with intentional attacks whose aims are not only the removal of the
watermark signal, excluding those already encompassed in the robustness category since the watermarking
technique is assumed to be robust.
Some seminal works have already warned the watermarking community that digital watermarking may
not be a secure primitive (i.e., a tool providing information security) despite its robustness. However,
they only deal with dedicated attacks relevant to particular applications. The deadlock attack concerns
copyright protection and illustrates the impossibility toprevent somebody to watermark content with his
own technique and key (by embedding a watermark signal or by creating a fake original) [8]. This ruins
the identification of the owner because two watermarking channels interfere in the same piece of content.
The collusion attack (i.e., the mixing of several watermarked versions of the same content) is related to
the fingerprinting application. Multiple problems in the field of copyright protection and authentication
stems from the copy attack, where the attacker first copies a watermark and then pastes it in a different
piece of content [9]. The oracle attack is a threat whenever th opponent has access to a watermarking
detector as in copy protection for consumer electronics devices [10]. The attacker first estimates the
secret key, testing the detection process on different pieces of content [11]; this disclosure then helps
him forging pirated content. The number of detection tries is here of utmost importance.
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Articles proposing a complete analysis of robust watermarking security are extremely rare. The authors
are only aware of the pioneer work [12], where two digital modulation schemes achieve perfect secrecy,
and more recent works sketching a general framework for security analysis [13], [14]. The main idea
is here to adapt Shannon’s definition of cryptography security to watermarking. At the beginning of the
game, the watermarker selects a watermarking technique andpicks up randomly a secret key. According
to the Kerckhoffs’s principle, the opponent knows the select d algorithm but not the secret key. Then,
the watermarker starts producing some marked pieces of content. The opponent has access to some
observations and his aim is to estimate the private key. Shannon’s main idea is that information about
the private key might leak from the observations. Hence, thea posteriori uncertainty of the opponent
decreases as he makes more and more observations. However, the above-mentioned works have only
translated the cryptanalysis methodology into watermarking terminology.
The goal of this article is to offer a complete and workable thory of watermarking security. It
completes Barni’set al. approach, assessing for the really first time security levels of substitution and,
especially, spread spectrum based watermarking methods. Fr this purpose, the first section summarizes
the methodology and introduces the basic notation. Measurement of the information leakages are based
on Shannon’s mutual information for a substitutive watermarking method in section III and on Fisher’s
information for a spread spectrum based watermarking method in section IV. This yields estimation of
security levels for three types of attack. Yet, these information theory tools do not reveal any insight for
practical hacking of spread spectrum based watermarking. Section V tackles this algorithmic issue. Tools
from the blind source separation (BSS) field appear to be extremely helpful for the attacker, especially
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Independent Component Analysis (ICA).
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II. M ETHODOLOGY
A. Notation
Let us first list some notational conventions used in this paper. Vectors are sets in bold font, matrices
in calligraphic font, and sets in black board font. Data are witten in small letters, and random variables
in capital ones. The length of the vectors considered in thispaper isNv: x(i) is the i-th component of
vectorx. The probability density function of random variableX (or its probability mass function ifX
is discrete) is denoted bypX(.). Hidden messages haveNc bits and secret keys are usually composed of
Nc elements,e.g.several carriers:u` the `-th carrier. Finally,No vectors are considered:xNo represent
this collection of vectors andxj is the vectorx associated to thej-th observation.
B. The cryptanalytic approach
The methodology presented in this section is clearly inspired by the cryptanalysis. It has already
been presented in [14], and is based on three key articles: Kerckhoffs [15], Shannon [16] and Diffie-
Hellman [17]. We first briefly present these concepts, beforeformalizing them in the following subsections.
Kerckhoff’s principle.It has been stated in 1883 that keeping an encryption algorithm secret for years
is not realistic, and this principle is now used in any cryptographic study. In watermarking, the situation
is similar, and it is assumed that the opponent knows the waterm rking algorithm. Hence, for a given
design and implementation of an algorithm, the security stem from the secrecy of the key. The designer’s
challenge is: “Am I sure that an opponent will not exploit some weaknesses of the algorithm to disclose
the secret key?”. Watermarking processes are often split into three functions. The first one extracts some
features from content (issued by a classical transform, such as DCT, wavelet, FFT, Fourier Mellin, . . . ),
which are stored in a so-called extracted vector. The secondone mixes the extracted vector with the
secret watermark signal, giving a watermarked vector. Then, an insertion function reverses the extraction
process to come back in the original world, putting out the watermarked document. Fig. 1 illustrates the
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Fig. 2. Global point of view of the detection process
embedding process. The detection follows an analogous process as sketched in Fig. 2. According to the
Kerckhoff’s principle, the opponent knows all the involvedfunctions. He thus observes the watermarked
vectors from contents he has access to, because the extraction function has no secret parameter.
Shannon’s approach.The methodology for studying the security of encryption schemes is here trans-
posed to watermarking. The embedder has randomly picked up asecret key, and used it to watermark
several pieces of content. The opponent observes these piecs of watermarked content, all related to the
same secret key but hiding different messages. The watermarking technique isperfectly secureif and
only if no information about the secret key leaks from the observations. If it is not the case, thesecurity
level is defined as the number of observations which are needed to disclose the secret key. The bigger
the information leakage is, the smaller the security level of the watermarking scheme will be.
Diffie-Hellman’s terminology.According to the context of the attack, the opponent may haveaccess
to several kinds of data. The opponent has at least access to watermarked content, but, in some cases, he
might also observe the hidden messages (for instance, the nam of the author in copyright protection or
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Fig. 3. An analogy with cryptography: plaintextm → watermarkw, keyk → original x, ciphertextc → watermarked content
y.
the status of a movie in copy protection) or to the original data (for instance, imagine DVD movies are
watermarked for copy protection; original version of old movies were not protected). This implies that a
security level is assessed for a given context. In this article, we study:
• the Watermarked Only Attack (WOA), in which the opponent only hasNo watermarked vectors
yNo ;
• the Known Message Attack (KMA), in which the opponent only has No watermarked vectors and
the associate messages(y,m)No ;
• the Known Original Attack (KOA), in which the opponent only has No watermarked vectors and
the corresponding original ones(y,x)No .
The reader might be surprised that the KOA context deserves any attention. Seemingly, there is no need
to attack watermarked content when one has the original version. The pirate does not hack these pieces
of content, but his goal is to gain information about the secret key, in order to, later on, hack different
pieces of content watermarked with the same key.
C. Perfect covering
Although encryption and watermarking are two different security primitives, they might look like the
same at first sight. Fig. 3 illustrates this analogy investigated in this subsection.
Shannon definedperfect secrecyof a crypto-system by the inability of opponents to refine theproba-
bility distribution of plaintextsm by observing related cipher texts, all encrypted by key. We adapt this
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definition to watermarking, stating that the most importantthing to be hidden is the watermark signal,
and not the original content. The equivalent of the plaintext is, here, the watermark signal.
Definition 1: A watermark embedding makes aperfect coveringif pW(w) = pW(w|y) for any(y,w).
This means that in a perfect covering scheme, the observations of only watermarked pieces of contents
will never reveal any information on the watermark signal:I(Y;W) = 0. If K → W → Y is a Markov
chain,I(Y;W) ≥ I(Y;K) holds. Consequently, perfect covering implies perfect secrecy.
Shannon easily found a necessary condition to get perfect secrecy, by using his information theory
tools: H(M) ≤ H(K), whereH(.) denotes the entropy, that is,H(M) = −∑m p(m) log p(m). Yet,
the same proof yields the following necessary condition to get perfect covering:H(W) ≤ H(X). This
deeply reveals the difference between cryptography and waterm rking. As suggested by the greek word
κρυπτω (meaning “I hide”), the role of the secret key is, in encryption, to hide the meaning of the
plaintext. Hence, its entropy should be greater or equal to the one of the plaintext. Whereas steganography
(στεγανω means “I cover”) hides the watermark covered by the host signal.
D. Information leakages and physical interpretation
If a watermarking scheme does not provide perfect secrecy, then one would like to measure the
information leakage on the secret key. For this purpose, this subsection presents several tools from
information theory, which will later be useful to analyze classical watermarking schemes.
1) Shannon’s measure:In the case where the secret keyK is a discrete variable, and more usually a
binary word, the entropyH(K) measures the uncertainty of the opponent on the true value ofk. When
he makes some observations1 ONo , his uncertainty is now evaluated through a conditional entropy, which
Shannon namedequivocation: H(K|ONo) = H(K)− I(K;ONo). The information leakage is measured
by the mutual information between the observations and the secret key. The bigger the information leakage
1e.g.observations can be “cipher texts”, or “pairs of plain/cipher texts”.
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is, the smaller the uncertainty of the opponent is. Equivocati n is a non increasing function withNo. It
goes fromH(K), ideally down to0. When it becomes null, this means that the opponent has enough
observations to uniquely determine the secret key. Shannondefi ed theunicity distancethe first value of
No for which the equivocation becomes null, , meaning that the set of all possible keys is now reduced
to only one element. This is a way to measure the security level No? of a primitive.
Unfortunately, these tools are not suitable for any watermarking scheme. It is well known that entropy
(or conditional entropy) of a continuous random variable dos not measure a quantity of information.
Mutual informationI(K;ONo) is always pertinent as a measure of information leakages; but the physical
interpretation of the equivocation as the remaining uncertainty does not hold when the secret key is
regarded as a continuous random variable as in section IV. For instance, the equivocation can take
positive or non positive values, ruining the concept of unicity distance.
2) Fisher’s measure:This is the reason why another information measurement is proposed. In statistics,
Fisher was one of the first to introduce the measure of the amount f information supplied by the
observations about an unknown parameter to be estimated. Suppose observationO is a random variable
with a probability distribution function depending on a parameter vectorθ. TheFisher Information Matrix
(FIM) concerningθ is defined as
FIM(θ) = EψψT with ψ = ∇θ log pO(o;θ), (1)
whereE is the mathematical expectation operator and∇θ is the gradient vector operator defined by
∇θ = (∂/∂θ[1], . . . , ∂/∂θ[Nθ])T . The Cramér-Rao theorem gives a lower bound of the covariance matrix
of an unbiaised estimator of parameter vectorθ whenever the FIM is invertible:
Rˆθ ≥ FIM(θ)
−1, (2)
in the sense of non-negative definiteness of the difference matrix. In our framework, the parameter vector
can be the watermark signal or the secret key. (2) provides usa physical interpretation: the bigger the
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information leakage is, the more accurate the estimation ofthe secret parameter is.
The FIM is also an additive measure of the information, provided the observations are statistically
independent. Suppose that the watermark signal has been added in No pieces of content whose ex-
tracted vectors are independent and identically distributed asX ∼ N (0,RX). The observations areNo
watermarked signals. Then,log pO(o;w) = −1/2
∑No
j=1(yj − w)R−1X (yj − w)T + const. Calculation
readily gives FIM(w) = NoR−1X . This models applications which detect presence of (and notdecode)
watermarks, or also template signals which resynchronize content transformed by a geometric attack .
The mean square errorE{‖θ̂ − θ‖2} is the trace ofRˆθ, and thus its lower bound decreases in
No
−1. However, the rateNo? = Notr(FIM(θ)−1) depends on the statistical model and consequently the
kind of observations (see section IV). The estimation is significantly more accurate when the number
of independent observations increases of an order ofNo?. The biggerNo?, the more difficult is the
disclosure of the secret key. This notion is close to the unicity distance of the above subsection. This is
the reason why we use the same notationNo? (although absolutely not defined in the same way).
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SUBSTITUTIVE METHOD
A. Mathematical model
In such a scheme, a binary vectorx = (x(1) . . . x(Nv))T is extracted from the content. For instance,
in the famous Burgett, Koch, and Zao technique [18],Nv pairs of DCT coefficients of an image are
compared in absolute value. The message to be hidden is a binary vectorm = (m(1) . . . m(Nc))T . The
secret key is a list ofNc integersk = [k(1), . . . , k(Nc)] with 1 ≤ k(`) ≤ Nv and k(`) 6= k(`′) if
` 6= `′. The embedding process copiesx in y and then substitutes thek(`)-th bit of y by the`-th bit of
the message to be hidden:y(k(`)) = m(`). The inverse extraction function maps back the watermarked
vectory into the content. The decoding simply reads the bits whose indices are given by the secret key.
Example 1:Nv = 8 andNc = 4:
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m = (1101) k = [2, 8, 5, 3]
x = (01001011) y = (01100011)
The uncertainty of the opponent is given by the entropy of thesecret key that the embedder has
randomly selected amongNv!/(Nv − Nc)! possible keys. Thus:
H(K) = log2
Nv!
(Nv − Nc)!
(3)
B. Perfect covering
Theorem 1:As defined above, a substitutive watermarking scheme provides perfect covering.
Proof: We can model the substitutive watermarking as follows: let x be a binaryNv-length random
vector, whose probability mass function is uniform and equal to 2−Nv , andw be a binaryNv-length
vector whose bits equal to 1 indicates the bits to be flipped. Hence, we havey = x⊕ w, giving:
pY(y) =
∑
w∈W
pY(y|w)pw(w) =
∑
w∈W
pX(y ⊕ w)pw(w)
= 2−Nv
∑
w∈W
pw(w) = 2
−Nv ,
pY(y|w) = pX(y ⊕ w) = 2−Nv .
The Bayes rule,pY(y|w)pW(w) = pW(w|y)pY(y), then givespW(w) = pW(w|y).
C. Watermarked Only Attack
The substitutive method providing perfect covering, it is then very easy to show thatI(Y;W) = 0,
which implies thatI(Y;K) = 0. There is no information leakage, and the equivocation is equal toH(K)
whatever the number of observations. In a way, one can say that security levelNo? = +∞.
D. Known Message Attack
If the opponent observes only one watermarked contenty1 and its hidden messagem1, the indices
i such thaty1(i) = m1(`) are possible values ofk(`). DenoteS1(`) this set. AsP (y1(i) = m1(`)|i 6=
k(`)) = 1/2, there are in expectation1 + (Nv − 1)/2 elements in this set.
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Fig. 4. Substitutive watermarking: equivocations for WOA,KMA and KOA, against the number of observations.Nc = 64,
Nv = 512. The triangle and the square respectively mark the securitylevels for the KMA and KOA.
Now assume that the opponent observes several contentsyNo and their hidden messagesmNo . Set
SNo(`) is now defined bySNo(`) = {i : yj(i) = mj(`) ∀j, 1 ≤ j ≤ No}. The probability thatyj(i) =
mj(`)∀j knowing thati 6= k(`) is 1/2No . Thus, in expectation,|SNo | = 1 + (Nv − 1)/2No , and the
equivocation aboutk(`) is equal tolog2(1 + 2
−No(Nv − 1)). However, there might be some overlapping
between theNc setsSNo(`), and the total equivocation is smaller than the sum of the equivocations about
k(`). As the calculus is quite complex, we stay with this approximat on:
H(K|(Y,M)No) . Nc log2(1 + 2−No(Nv − 1)). (4)
Shannon approximated this equivocation byNc(log2(Nv − 1) − No) when No  log2(Nv − 1), and
by 2−NoNc(Nv − 1)/ log(2) whenNo  log2(Nv − 1) (see Fig. 4). He also approximated the unicity
distance byNo? = log2 Nv [16, Sect. 14].
E. Known Original Attack
If the opponent observes only one watermarked contenty1 and its original versionx1, the indicesi
such thatx1(i) 6= y1(i) are possible values for the key samples. There are in expectation Nc/2 of such
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indices, asp(x1(k(`)) = m1(`)) = 1/2. When the opponent observesj pairs, the setSj = {` : ∃ j′, 1 ≤
j′ ≤ j, xj′(`) 6= yj′(`)} grows up. However, the event that an index revealed by a new pair was already
known happens with a probability|Sj−1|/Nc. This leads to the following series:
|Sj| = |Sj−1| + Nc(1 − |Sj−1|/Nc)/2 = Nc(1 − 2−j). (5)
Yet, it is not possible to assign a key sample to one of these indices. The equivocation is then the sum
of two terms: one is due to theNc − |SNo | undisclosed indices to be picked up randomly among the
remaining candidates, the second one is due to theNc! possible permutations of the chosen indices:
H(K|(Y,X)No) = log2
(
(Nv − d|SNo |e)!
(Nv − Nc)!(Nc − d|SNo |e)!
)
+ log2(Nc!). (6)
The security level (in the unicity distance sense) is not defined as the equivocation is always greater than
zero. This is due to the termlog2(Nc!) reflecting the ambiguity in the order of the estimated key samples.
We preferably consider that within a number of observationsgreater thanNo? = log2 Nc, the opponent
learns all the indices store in the secret key. This information is helpful for watermark jamming. He can
also notice if two hidden messages are the same. Yet, the ambiguity prevents him reading the hidden
messages (he cannot put the hidden bits in the right order), and writing hidden messages.
Fig. 4 gives a good synthesis of the results. In the WOA case, the opponent cannot get any information
on the key, and then cannot do anything. In the KMA case, he is able to completely disclose the key,
and then he will be able to read, erase, write or modify hiddenm ssages. In the KOA case, he is able to
recover the components of the key but up to a permutation, andthen he will be able to erase the hidden
message, but not to read or write a proper one.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF SPREAD SPECTRUM BASED TECHNIQUES
Spread spectrum is a military communication scheme invented during World War II [19]. It was
designed to be good at combatting interference due to jamming, hiding a signal by transmitting it at low
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power, and achieving secrecy. These properties make spreadspectrum very popular in nowadays digital
watermarking. Theoretical studies [6] and practical implementations [20] focus on the optimization of
operational capacity-robustness functions at given embedding distortions.
A. Mathematical model
Denote byx a vector ofNv samples extracted from original content. The embedding is the addition
of the watermark signal which is the modulation ofNc private carriersu`:
w =
γ√
Nc
Nc∑
`=1
a(`)u`, (7)
whereγ > 0 is a small gain fixing the embedding strength, and‖u`‖ = 1, 1 ≤ ` ≤ Nc. The Watermark
to Content power Ratio (WCR) equalsγ2σ2a/σ
2
x (or 10 log10(γ
2σ2a/σ
2
x) if expressed in dB). The inverse
extraction puts back vectory = x + w into the media producing watermarked content.
Symbol vectora represents the message to be hidden/transmitted through content. In the case of a Direct
Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS), the modulation is a simpleBPSK:a(`) = (−1)m(`), 1 ≤ ` ≤ Nc and
σ2a = 1. Yet, the scope of this model is far broader than the sole caseof DSSS. Spread spectrum is a very
common process used to increase the signal to noise ratio by projecting signals on a smaller subspace of
dimensionNc < Nv. This also covers some side-informed watermarking techniques (sometimes called
spread transform) [5], [21]–[23]. Symbolsa(`) are then continuous real values (see subsection V-D).
For security reason, the carriers are private and issued by apseudo-random generator fed by a seed.
Many people think the secret key is the seed. This is not falses the disclosure of the seed obviously
gives the carriers and allows the watermarking channel access. However, the knowledge of the carriers
is sufficient and the pirate has no interest in getting back tothe seed. Hence, in this article, the secret
key, defined as the object the opponent is keen on revealing, is the carriers.
In the sequel, the security analysis considers several waterm rked vectorsyj , 1 ≤ j ≤ No, with
different embedded messagesaj = (aj(1) . . . aj(Nc))T being linearly mixed by theNv × Nc matrix
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U = (u1 . . . uNc). To cancel inter-symbol interferences at the decoding side, carriers are two-by-two
orthogonal vectors:UTU = INc , whereIN is theN ×N identity matrix. Indexi denotes theith samples
of a signal, whereasj indices the different signals. Thus, there areNo watermarked vectors given by:
yj = xj +
γ√
Nc
Uaj , (8)
or, equivalently, concatenatingNo vectorsxj (resp.yj or aj) column-wise in theNv × No matrix X
(resp.Y or theNc × No matrix A):
Y = X + γ√
Nc
UA . (9)
B. Perfect covering
Assume thatX ∼ N (0,RX) and thatw is picked up randomly among sequences distributed as
N (0,RW). Then, pY = N (0,RX + RW) and pY|W=w = N (w,RX). The Bayes rule shows that
spread spectrum based watermarking does not provide perfect covering. Even if the attacker has only
access to watermarked pieces of content, some information ab ut the watermark signal is leaking from
these observations. The following subsections investigate whether the opponent can, thanks to this leakage
on the watermark signal, gain some knowledge about the secret ca riers.
C. Known Message Attack
In this subsection, the opponent has access to (watermarkedsignals/hidden messages) pairs. Moreover,
only the DSSS technique (i.e., a BPSK modulation) is considered. Our attack may not work with s de
information embedding because the opponent still ignores symbolsa, as they also depend on the original
signal. Formally, the observations considered in this subsection are(y,a)No .
Assume, for simplicity reason, that each occurrence of random vectorX is independently drawn from
N (0, σ2xINv). The following theoretical derivations (as well as the algorithm used in experiments in
section V) can be adapted to colored original signals and even non stationary original signals [24].
1st of July, 2004. Revised 9th of November, 2004. DRAFT
16 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SIGNAL PROCESSING, VOL.XX, NO.Y, XYZ 2005
Another motivation is that, according to the Power SpectrumConstraint [25], watermark signals usually
adopt the statistical structure of host signals in order to increase their robustness,i.e. RW = γ2RX.
Hence, the Karhunen-Loève Transform simultaneously whitens both signals.
The likelihood is the probability of observing the datayNo , while knowing the model:
L(yNo) =
1
(
√
2πσx)NoNv
e
„
− 1
2σ2x
PNo
j=1 ‖yj− γ√
Nc
Uaj‖2
«
, (10)
and the log-likelihood islog L = K − 12σ2x
∑No
j=1 ‖yj − γ√NcUaj)‖
2. The opponent wants to estimate the
private carriersuNc . So, the derivative implied in the FIM isψ = ∂ log L/∂(uT1 . . . u
T
Nc
)T with
∂ log L
∂u`
=
γ
σ2x
√
Nc
No∑
j=1
aj(`)xj . (11)
Product expectation gives the followingNv × Nv sub-blocks:
E
(
∂ log L
∂u`
)(
∂ log L
∂uk
)T
=
γ2
Ncσ2x
(Fuu)`,k
=
γ2
Ncσ2x
No∑
j=1
aj(`)aj(k)INv .
The FIM is then the following block matrix:
FIM =
γ2
Ncσ2x


(Fuu)1,1 . . . (Fuu)1,Nc
...
...
(Fuu)Nc,1 . . . (Fuu)Nc,Nc


=
γ2
Ncσ2x
Fuu No→+∞−→ No
γ2σ2a
Ncσ2x
INvNc . (12)
With a BPSK modulation,σa = 1. The information leakage is linear with the number of observations,
thanks to the assumption of independence, and the rate is given by the Watermark to Content power
Ratio per carrierγ2/Ncσ2x. The security level of spread spectrum based watermarking techniques against
KMA is No? = Ncσ2x/γ
2 of (watermarked signals/hidden messages) pairs.
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D. Known Original Attack
The opponent observes(y,x)No . The vector difference of each observationj gives the source signals
aj being linearly mixed by theNv × Nc matrix U :
dj = yj − xj =
γ√
Nc
Uaj. (13)
Assume thatNo ≥ Nc and that there are at leastNc linearly independent messages. The difference
matrix D = Y − X ∝ UA is then full rank, and Span(D) = Span(U). The observation of difference
vectors discloses the secret subspace Span(U), provided symbol matrixA is full rank. However, this
doesn’t reveal the private carriers. Denote byE a matrix whose columns constitute an orthonormal basis
of the subspace Span(D). We haveE = UPT , with P a unitaryNc × Nc matrix. A priori, there is no
reason for whichP = INc . Hence, decoding the symbols with matrixE gives the following mixture
v =
√
NcETd/γ = Pa. This is a blind source separation (BSS) problem with a square mixing matrix.
Comon proved that it is possible to identifyP (and thusU), but up to a permutation and scale ambiguity,
only if at most one source is Gaussian [26]. The scale ambiguity is indeed a sign ambiguity in our
problem, as we setUTU = I. In conclusion, at best, the mixing matrix is identified byÛ = ΠΣU with
Π a permutation matrix andΣ a diagonal matrix whose elements are±1. At best for the opponent, the
secret carriers are identified up to a signed permutation (i.e., matrix ΠΣ) ambiguity.
The likelihood to observev for a given matrixP is p(v;P) = |detP|−1pA(P−1v), and its score is:
∂
∂P log p(v;P) = −P
−T + P−Tχ(P−1v)vTP−T , (14)
with χ(x) = − ∂
∂x
log pA(x) [27]. The asymptotic accuracy of the estimations is known tobe only
dependent on the symbols distribution, and especially on its on-Gaussianity. As, in our case, symbols
are i.i.d., denote byχ(.) the score function ofaj(i), and byχn(.) the score function of a Gaussian
random variable sharing the same variance (i.e., χn(x) = x/σ2a). The trace of the Cramér-Rao Bound is
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then shown to be proportional to(g−1 + 1/2)/2No for largeNo [28], with g defined as:
g =
E{(χ(a) − χn(a))2}
E{χn(a)2}
. (15)
However,g is not above bounded and tends to+∞ when the symbols tend to have a discrete or bounded
support. This is typically the case in watermarking, as the emb dder would not allow the use of unbounded
symbols for a perceptual distortion reason. In the case of discrete symbols, error free mixing matrix
recovery is possible within a finite number of observations.For instance, [29] shows a workable algorithm
needingNo > Nc2 observations for BPSK symbols. In the case of bounded support symbols, the trace
of CRB decreases at a faster rate than1/No [28], [30].
E. Watermarked Only Attack
In this section, the sources are unknown and can then be regarded s nuisance parameters [31], [32].
Vectorψ equals then∂ log L/∂(uT1 . . . u
T
Nc
aT1 . . . a
T
No
)T , with the followingNc × 1 vectors:
∂ log L
∂aj
=
γ
σ2x
√
Nc
UTxj ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , No}. (16)
Product expectation gives the following sub-blocks:
E
(
∂ log L
∂aj
∂ log L
∂ak
T )
=
γ2
Ncσ2x
(Faa)j,k =
γ2
Ncσ2x
INcδj,k
E
(
∂ log L
∂u`
∂ log L
∂aj
T )
=
γ2
Ncσ2x
(Fua)`,j =
γ2
Ncσ2x
(Fau)Tj,`,
whereδi,j is the Kronecker function. We write with explicit notation:
FIM =
γ2
Ncσ2x


Fuu Fua
Fau Faa

 . (17)
Note thatFaa = INoNc . The Cramér-Rao Bound for estimated Vect(U) = (uT1 , . . . ,uTNc)T is given by:
CRB(Vect(U)) = Ncσ
2
x
γ2
F̃−1uu , (18)
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with F̃uu = (Fuu −FuaF−1aa Fau) = (Fuu −FuaFau). It is known that, in the general case,F̃−1uu ≥ F−1uu
(i.e. F̃−1uu −F−1uu is non negative definite). In other words, nuisance parameters render the estimation of
U less accurate [27]. But, the situation is even worse here as the FIM becomes singular. Indeed:
(FuaFau)`,k =
No∑
j=1
(Fua)`,j(Fau)j,k =
No∑
j=1
aj(`)aj(k)UUT , (19)
thereforeF̃uu = AAT ⊗ (INv − UUT ). As (INv − UUT )uk = 0, F̃uu is singular.
This problem stems from two facts. First, we did not integrate some constraints during our derivation.
Especially, we know thatuT` uk = δ`,k. [31] gives an alternative expression for the bound in the case
where the unconstrained problem is unidentifiable and the FIM non invertible.
However, the integration of the above-mentioned constraints in the derivation of the FIM is not sufficient
for Nc > 1. The second fact is that an ambiguity remains about the orderand ‘phase’ of the carriers.
The system is only identifiable up to a signed permutation. The caseNc = 1 is interesting, as constraint
integration removes the FIM singularity because the ambiguity of the permutation does not exist.
1) One carrier: The parameter vector to be estimated is composed of the unique carrier and the hidden
symbols as nuisance parameters:(UTA). Please, note thatUT andA are row vectors in this case. The
constraint onu1 is: (‖u1‖2−1)/2 = 0. The sequel is only the strict application of [31]. The1×(Nv+No)
gradient matrix of the constraint is equal toG = (uT1 0TNo), where0N is a N zero vector. There exists a
matrix H ∈ R(Nv+No)×(Nv+No−1) whose columns form a basis for the nullspace ofG, that is, such that
GH = 0. In our case, one particular choice ofH is readily verified to be:
H =


U⊥ 0
0 INo

 , (20)
with U⊥ a basis of the complementary subspace of Span(u1) in RNv . Then, according to [31, Th. 1], the
Cramér-Rao Bound under the above-mentioned constraint isCRB(UTA) = H(HT FIM H)−1HT . With
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our choice ofH, this yields:
CRB(UTA) = σ
2
x
γ2


(AAT )−1U⊥U⊥T 0
0 INo

 , (21)
and we finally get:
CRB(UT ) = σ
2
x
γ2
(AAT )−1U⊥U⊥T No→+∞−→ σ
2
x
Noσ2aγ
2
U⊥U⊥T . (22)
2) Nc carriers (Nc > 1): The ambiguity renders the FIM singular, even when considering the
constraints. However, section V shows that, in practice, thopponent builds noisy estimation of the
carriers up to a signed permutation. A possibility in [32], is to pretend that the opponent knowsNm
messages (for instance{a`}Nm`=1), in order toartificially remove the ambiguity. This addsNmNc constraints
of the type:âj(`) = aj(`). At the end, calculation leads to:
CRB(Vect(U)) = Ncσ
2
x
γ2
HuuB−1HuuT , (23)
with B the Nc(Nv −Nm)×Nc(Nv −Nm) matrix whose(Nv −Nm)× (Nv −Nm) blocks are(B)`,k =
(AAT )`,kU⊥T` U⊥k −(ANm:NoANm:NoT )`,kU⊥Tl UUTU⊥k , andHuu theNcNv×Nc(Nv−1) diagonal matrix
whoseNv × (Nv − 1) blocks on diagonal are(Huu)`,` = U⊥` . In these expressions, the columns ofU⊥`
form an orthonormal basis of the complementary subspace of Span(u`), andANm:No = (aNm+1 . . . aNo).
However, the minimal numberNm to remove the ambiguity depends on the symbols’ pdf [32].
Facing the difficulty of finding the right parameterNm and the cumbersome calculus, we prefer to
approximate the information leakage about a carrier by (22), whereγ2 is replaced by the power per
carrier γ2/Nc. The security level is thenNo? = Ncσ2x/σ
2
aγ
2 which is, by the way, coherent with (23).
This is quite surprising because the security level is the same gainst KMA. Yet, the estimation of the
secret carriers remains up to a signed permutation in the WOA.
F. Possible Hacks
The conclusion of this security analysis stands in the different possibilities to forge pirated content.
DRAFT 1st of July, 2004. Revised 9th of November, 2004.
CAYRE et al.: WATERMARKING SECURITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 21
• The pirate discloses secret subspace Span(U). He can now focus attack’s noise in this subspace to
jam the communication far more efficiently. He can also nullify the watermarked signals projection
in this subspace to remove the watermark.
• The pirate discloses the secret carriers up to a signed permutation. The above-mentioned hacks are
still possible. Besides, he can detect whether two watermarked pieces of content share the same
hidden message. He can also flip some randomly chosen bits. Moreover, the accidental knowledge
of hidden messages in few watermarked pieces of content might remove this ambiguity. This extra
security analysis indeed pertains to subsection III-D.
• The pirate discloses the secret carriers. He has a full access to the watermarking channel to read,
write or erase hidden message.
Of course, the quality of the pirated pieces of content depends on the accuracy of his estimation. The
authors focus on this aspect in [33].
V. A LGORITHMS FOR SPREAD SPECTRUM BASED TECHNIQUES
Section III not only gives security levels of the substitutive method, but also contains almost practical
implementations of workable algorithms. On the contrary, section IV only presents theoretical assessment
of security levels. Hence, this section deals with practical algorithms useful to hack spread spectrum
based watermarking schemes. For each attack, an algorithm is presented, and tested on synthetic data as
supposed by the model of (8), with BPSK symbols and gaussian host vectors. These algorithms are then
applied on spread transform side information methods and one still image technique.
This section has an intensive use of PCA and ICA algorithms, which is completely new in watermarking
security analysis, as the only other papers mentioning PCA/ICA in the watermarking community have
different purposes. [34] and [35] used ICA to design a watermarking embedder. [36] presented a technique
for estimating the watermark by observing only one image. Their purpose is the simple erasure of the
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whole watermark signal and not the disclosure of the secret parameters, whereas the approach here allows
a complete access to the watermarking communication channel to r move, read or write hidden data2.
The following average normalized correlation measures theefficiency of our attack:
η =
1
Nc
Nc∑
`=1
ûT` u`
‖û`‖
. (24)
Although the normalization renders estimatorsûj/‖ûj‖ biased [38], the normalized correlation is pre-
ferred because it is an extremely popular measure in the waterm rking community.η . 1 means that the
opponent discloses vectors almost collinear with the secret carriers. When existing, we manually removed
the ambiguity of the signed permutation. Measures ofη are done averagingNt = 128 experimental results.
The relation with the theoretical security levels is not difficult to find out. (24) is in expectation the
cosine of the angle betweenu` and û` = u` + n, n being the estimation noise (orthogonal tou` and
whose norm is
√
tr(CRB(Vect(U)))/Nc, with tr(A) the trace of matrixA.) The following relation holds:
η ≈ ‖u`‖√
‖u`‖2 + tr(CRB(Vect(U)))/Nc
. (25)
A. Known Message Attack
Observing(y,a)No , the opponent can use the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) related to (10).
This estimator is also defined by∂ log L
∂u`
= 0 ∀` ∈ {1, . . . , Nc}, which gives:
Û =
√
Nc
γ
(YAT )(AAT )−1. (26)
The MLE is known to be unbiased and consistent,i.e. it asymptotically achieves the CRB derived in
subsection IV-D. Fig. (5) shows experimental values ofη againstNo and WCR= γ2/σ2x for the DSSS
case. The locus of points such thatη = const are projected on the planeη = 0. They appear to be
parallel with the curveNo = Ncσ2x/γ
2. Tests done with differentNv confirm that the efficiency of the
2We discovered after submission a similar approach uniquelyd voted to watermark removal and only based on PCA in [37].
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Fig. 5. KMA for DSSS (Nc = 4, Nv = 512). η againstlog10(No) and WCR in dB. The curveNo = Ncσ
2
x/γ
2 is plotted
with small circles.
attack does not depend on the vector length. This asserts theheoretical security level of subsection IV-C.
B. Known Original Attack
In this case, the opponent observes several instances ofdj = (yj−xj) ∝ Uaj. As seen in subsection IV-
D, this is related to the well known problem of signal processing called Blind Source Separation (BSS),
with no noise. A lot of papers have already been written on BSS, and we just recall here its most common
algorithms. Note that spread spectrum corresponds to the BSS over-determined case (i.e., Nv ≥ Nc).
The most classical algorithm in BSS is the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). DenoteD = Y−X .
This technique makes an eigendecomposition of the matrixDDT = γ2UAATUT /Nc. This corresponds
to a Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of vectorsdNo . Please, note thatρ
∆
= Rank(A) is also the rank
of DDT . Hence, the decomposition outputsρ orthonormal vectors lying in Span(U). In the best case,
the opponent hasρ = min(No, Nc). Nevertheless, in reality, he may haveρ ≤ min(No, Nc) if the No
symbol vectors are linearly dependent.
When successful (i.e., when ρ = Nc), the PCA technique yields a orthonormal basis of the secret
subspace Span(U). The possibilities to hack watermarked pieces of content when Span(U) is disclosed
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û2û1
u1
u2
(PCA)

6
-
6
u1
u2
û2
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Fig. 6. PCAvs. ICA. PCA finds the secret carriers up to a rotation, whereas ICA succeeds to align the estimated carriersûNc
with uNc (Here,Nc = 2). An ambiguity remains in their order (permutation) and orientation (sign).
are summarized in subsection IV-F. Yet, the vectors of this ba is are not necessary collinear with the
private carriers. This is due to the unitary matrixP mentioned in subsection IV-D. The opponent cannot
decode, as projection of watermarked signals onto this basis gives a mixture of the hidden symbols. This
is illustrated by Fig. 6. The same reason prevents him transmitting information in the hidden channel.
Nevertheless, under the assumption that the symbol vectorsare tatistically independent, the opponent
can resort to a more powerful tool: the Independent Component Analysis (ICA). It is an extension of
PCA, constraining the output estimated symbol vectors to beind pendent [26]. Good tutorials on ICA
and on its links with BSS are [28], [39]. A very general ICA algorithm named FastICA [40] has been
preferred to algorithms dedicated to specific symbol distribu ion [29], [30].
In short, ICA algorithms usually work in the basis recoveredby a PCA. This basis describes exactly
the secret subspace (provided thatρ = Nc). The problem is now reduced to the estimation of theNc×Nc
matrix P. Hence, parameterNv has absolutely no influence on the attack. Then, in an iterativ process,
the ICA ‘rotates’ the basis until it nullifies an objective function (often called a constrast function) of the
estimated sourceŝaNo . This function can be an approximation of the mutual information of the estimated
sources. Contrast functions depend on the distribution of the symbol sources. However, this measure
reflects statistical independence only for largeNo. For a finite number of observations, ICA algorithms
usually search for a minimum of the contrast function with the help of a gradient descent technique.
When successful, ICA reduces the set of ambiguity matricesP to the one of signed permutations.
This is illustrated by Fig. 6. Subsection IV-F lists the possibilities to hack watermarked pieces of content
DRAFT 1st of July, 2004. Revised 9th of November, 2004.
CAYRE et al.: WATERMARKING SECURITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 25
when the carriers are disclosed up to a signed permutation.
C. Watermarked Only Attack
The WOA case is quite similar to KOA, as it is related to BSS in aoisy environment. The covariance
matrix Ry has the following expression:
Ry = Rx +
γ2
Nc
URaUT = σ2xI +
γ2σ2a
Nc
UUT . (27)
Its diagonalization leads toNc eigenvalues equalingσ2x +
γ2σ2a
Nc
, andNv − Nc eigenvalues equalingσ2x.
Hence, the eigenvectors related to theNc biggest values constitute a basis of Span(U), which is also
known as the signal space in blind equalization for digital communications.
PCA estimates covariance matrixRy by YYT /No, and outputsNc eigenvectors whose eigenvalues are
the biggest ones. Due to this rough estimation, these vectors do not live exactly in Span(U). Compared to
Fig. 6, these noisy estimation vectors would not lie in the plan of the page, regarded as subspace Span(U)
in this simple example. However, ICA will still try to rotatehem in order to render the decoded symbols
independent. Fig. 7 shows the locus of points such thatη = const for different values ofNc and No,
with the DSSS method (i.e., a BPSK modulation). The ICA algorithm meets the theoretical limit only
for largeNo, and high energy of watermark signal per carrier:γ2Nv/Nc. Note that, forNc = 4, the gap
between experimental performances and theoretical limit gets larger.
D. Spread transform side information watermarking
This subsection presents experiments with side information watermarking using the process on spread
spectrum. In these methods, the symbolsaj(`) depend on the host signal in the following way:
aj(`) = f(mj(`),u
T
` xj) (28)
Three techniques were investigated: Improved Spread Spectrum (ISS) [23], Scalar Costa Scheme (SCS)
[21], and Maximized Robustness Embedding (MRE) [22]. Two implementations of SCS have been done.
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Fig. 7. WOA for DSSS. Operating points achievingη = 0.8 for different parametersNc andNv. The solid line is the theoretical
limit for Nc = 1, and curves with stars, circles and triangles are the experimental results. They capture the efficiency of the
PCA, as only one carrier is used. The dashed line is the theoretical limit for Nc = 4 (i.e. the solid line translated oflog10(Nc)),
the dashed curve with circles is the experimental results wih the FastICA algorithm [40].
The carriers have disjoint supports in the first one, which isa possible interpretation of [21]:u1 =
(uT0Tτ . . . 0
T
τ )
T , u2 = (0Tτ u
T . . . 0Tτ )
T , and so on withτNc = Nv. The second implementation is called
SCS with Subspace Projection (SSP) [41]: the carriers have afull support and are orthonormal. The
embedding distortion, the vector length and the number of hidden bits are the same for a fair comparison.
The KMA case has not been investigated. The knowledge of the messages does not usually imply the
disclosure of the symbols. In SCS, functionf(.) of (28) is private and depends on a secret key (i.e.,
a dithering vector). However, information about the symbols may leak from the message. Symbols are
Gaussian variables centered onγ(−1)mj(`) for the ISS technique:
aj(`) = γ(−1)mj(`) − λuT` xj . (29)
We foresee that the MLE algorithm could easily be tuned to exploit this information leakage.
The KOA is simpler, as the basic assumption is still valid:uT` xj and u
T
k xj (k 6= `) are Gaussian
distributed and non correlated; thus, the symbols are statistically independent. Yet, the efficiency of
BSS depends on the symbols distribution, so that we expect different performances. Once again, in our
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Fig. 8. KOA for four different watermarking techniques(Nc = 4, Nv = 512). Dotted line:η = (1 + k/No)−1; Dash-dotted
line: η = (1 + (k/No)2)−1.
simulation, the opponent always uses the same generic ICA algorithm. No fine tuning according to the
expected symbols distribution is done. Fig. (8) shows the results, except for SCS3. Surprisingly, the rate
of the noise estimation variance is in1/No2 for DSSS, SSP and MRE. This seems to be due to the
bounded support feature of the symbols in these methods, despite of the use of a generic algorithm. For
ISS, the rate is in1/No. Please, note that, according to (29), the KOA for ISS is similar to a WOA for
the SS method, with a watermark to host power ratio ofγ2/λ2σ2x. A smarter attack on ISS stems from
this remark. First, difference vectors are used to disclosethe secret subspace with a PCA. Then, they are
corrected in adding the projection of the original vectors scaled by a factorλ. We are now in a situation
similar to a KOA with DSSS. Finally, ICA finishes the job working on the corrected vectors. The last
curve named ‘Corrected ISS’ in Fig. (8) shows the dramatic improvement. The security level of ISS is
in practice as low as the DSSS one.
The WOA is also straightforward as we applied the same ICA algorithm for DSSS, ISS, MRE, and
SSP. For SCS, the observed watermarked vectors are split by chunks ofτ samples. Thus, the opponent
3For SCS,No = 1 is enough to disclose small length carrieru up to a sign.
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hasNo′ = Noτ vectors whose length isNv ′ = Nv/τ , watermarked withNc′ = 1 secret carrier. The
algorithm is thus a simple PCA in this case. Fig. (9) shows theresults. SCS (or more precisely the way we
have implemented it) is obviously the less secure. But the simple change brought in the implementation
of SSP is sufficient to correct this security flaw4. The other techniques share the same security level.
ISS seems to be slightly more secure; however, remember thatwe did not tune the contrast function of
the ICA algorithm. In the same way, the embedding parameters(γ, λ) play a big role in the symbols
distribution, and the attack might thus perform differently. This is the reason why we prefer to look at
the global shape of the curves, rather than to draw erroneousc nclusions from these meager differences.
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Fig. 9. WOA for five different watermarking methods (Nv = 512, Nc = 4, WCR=-15dB).τ = 128 for SCS. For SCS, SSP
and ISS, the embedding parameters are optimal for an expected noise attack whose distortion equals the embedding distortion:
WNR=0 dB.
4We only analyze here the security of the spreading transform. Yet, the dithering vector in SCS-like technique constitute a
second barrier, which will be the subject of a future work.
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E. Application to a robust watermarking technique
The goal of this last subsection is to demonstrate the power of ‘smart’ attacks based on secret carriers
estimation. So far, this article has investigated the first phase of the attack: the secret disclosure. Now, in
a second phase, the opponent uses thisa posteriori information to hack pieces of content, which were
watermarked with the same secret key. To this end, the subsection deals with real still images. The robust
watermarking technique from [20] has been chosen.
A challenge is proposed to two opponents: they attack a waterm rked image with an increasing attack
distortion, until an oracle warns them that the decoded message is different from the embedded message
(Nc = 8 bits, PSNR=38dB). Pirate A usesblind attacks (i.e., pertaining to the robustness issue – except
any geometric attack). For instance, in this article, he scale the size of the image by a quarter, JPEG
compresses it with a decreasing quality factor, and finally scales back the image. Pirate B usessmart
attacks. He has estimated the secret carriers by a WOA, withNo ∼ 1000 images such thatη = 0.55, and
he tries to remove the hidden information for one carrier. Details of algorithm adaptations to real images
may be found in [33]. Fig. (10) shows the result of the challenge for the Lena image. For a panel of 50
pictures (512 × 512 pixels), pirate B on average produces an attack distortion 15dB smaller than pirate
A to successfully hack watermarked pictures.
VI. CONCLUSION
As in cryptanalysis, measurement of information leakages is the fundamental principle underlying the
theoretical framework for robust watermarking security assessment presented in this article. A watermark-
ing technique, even robust, is not secure if the opponent canrefi e his knowledge on the presumably
secret key while pieces of content are watermarked with the same key. The security level is then defined
5The opponent cannot know this last value. However, nothing prevents him to run simulations with his own private carriers
in order to estimateη.
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(a) Pirate A (b) Pirate B
Fig. 10. Comparison between the two pirated Lena images. Thiis their best quality for a successful attack. Pirate A: PSNR=21.8
dB, Pirate B: PSNR=35.8 dB.
by the number of observations the opponent needs in order to accur tely estimate the secret key.
The conclusion of this article is not that spread spectrum based watermarking techniques or substitutive
schemes are broken. The goal is to warn the watermarking community that security is a crucial issue.
Designers should not only control the imperceptibility andthe robustness of their schemes but also
assess their security levels. Depending on the applicationdesigners are targeting (and especially on the
observations available to the pirate), watermarking several pieces of content with the same key might
bring threats. This potentially arises difficulties on the ky management. For instance, it is not clear
how a blind watermarking decoder will be informed of the secret key, if this later one is to be changed
according to the security levels assessed in this article.
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